Fix upload path-traversal RCE vector, patch all known-vulnerable deps
Path traversal (CWE-22/CWE-73): event-image, branding (logo/favicon), and event-attachment uploads built the saved filename from the client-supplied original filename with no sanitization, and multer's diskStorage joins that straight into the destination path. A crafted filename containing `../` sequences could write the uploaded file anywhere the server process has write access — reachable by any supervisor-level account, and briefly pre-auth via the branding uploads during initial /setup. Filenames are now always server- generated (random bytes + validated extension); the original name is kept only as display metadata. Dependencies: express-rate-limit was declared only at the repo root despite being required directly by backend/src/index.js, so a plain `cd backend && npm install` (per the deployment doc) would never install it — moved it into backend/package.json. Bumped next off a version affected by a critical unauthenticated RCE (React Flight protocol) and switched it from an exact pin to a caret range so future patches install automatically. Bumped multer/nodemailer/jsonwebtoken/ uuid to patched versions, with an override forcing the vulnerable nested uuid inside exceljs and the vulnerable postcss bundled inside next to the patched versions too. `npm audit` is now clean (0 vulnerabilities) across root, backend, and frontend. Hardening: jwt.verify() now pins algorithms: ['HS256'] instead of trusting the token header; /uploads now serves with a restrictive CSP and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so an uploaded SVG containing <script> can't execute if opened directly. Verified: backend's Jest suite passes, the backend boots and serves real requests on the bumped deps, and `next build` compiles/type- checks cleanly on the bumped frontend deps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CSWFWQsjTc9GyffPiXEDQT
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@@ -177,7 +177,16 @@ app.use('/api/backups', backupRoutes);
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// Pre-warm the settings cache so synchronous helpers have DB values from startup
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const { getSettingSync, warmCache } = require('./utils/settingsCache');
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warmCache().catch(() => {});
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app.use('/uploads', express.static('public/uploads'));
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// Uploaded branding assets can include SVGs, which may embed <script>/event
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// handlers. Serving them inline lets a compromised/malicious upload run script
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// in the site's origin if opened directly, so pin the safe response headers
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// (no inline execution, no MIME-sniffing to HTML/script) on every asset here.
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app.use('/uploads', express.static('public/uploads', {
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setHeaders: (res) => {
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res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox");
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res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
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},
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}));
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// ── Shared page helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
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@@ -347,7 +356,7 @@ app.get('/docs', async (req, res) => {
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let user;
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try {
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const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
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const decoded = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
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user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
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where: { id: decoded.id },
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select: { id: true, name: true, email: true, role: true, isActive: true, tokenVersion: true },
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