Admins (with 2FA) can view the site as a non-admin user for up to 30
minutes, with a required reason and a "Viewing as" banner. It is
strictly read-only: a guard mounted before every route refuses any
write made with an impersonation token, protect/optionalAuth check the
session is live, and GET handlers skip the price-refresh writes. Start,
end, reason and every page/API call (including blocked attempts) are
audited; optional email to the user.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CP62L9JxHomA36aYP1ekCe
Admins and supervisors without 2FA are sent a code at their next login,
and verifying it turns 2FA on. They can change the channel but not turn
it off. Older sessions without 2FA are rejected with TWO_FACTOR_REQUIRED,
and promoting a user ends their sessions so they enrol at next login.
The requirement is skipped when no email or WhatsApp channel can deliver
a code, and TWO_FACTOR_REQUIRED_ROLES=false switches it off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Path traversal (CWE-22/CWE-73): event-image, branding (logo/favicon),
and event-attachment uploads built the saved filename from the
client-supplied original filename with no sanitization, and multer's
diskStorage joins that straight into the destination path. A crafted
filename containing `../` sequences could write the uploaded file
anywhere the server process has write access — reachable by any
supervisor-level account, and briefly pre-auth via the branding
uploads during initial /setup. Filenames are now always server-
generated (random bytes + validated extension); the original name is
kept only as display metadata.
Dependencies: express-rate-limit was declared only at the repo root
despite being required directly by backend/src/index.js, so a plain
`cd backend && npm install` (per the deployment doc) would never
install it — moved it into backend/package.json. Bumped next off a
version affected by a critical unauthenticated RCE (React Flight
protocol) and switched it from an exact pin to a caret range so future
patches install automatically. Bumped multer/nodemailer/jsonwebtoken/
uuid to patched versions, with an override forcing the vulnerable
nested uuid inside exceljs and the vulnerable postcss bundled inside
next to the patched versions too. `npm audit` is now clean (0
vulnerabilities) across root, backend, and frontend.
Hardening: jwt.verify() now pins algorithms: ['HS256'] instead of
trusting the token header; /uploads now serves with a restrictive CSP
and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff so an uploaded SVG containing
<script> can't execute if opened directly.
Verified: backend's Jest suite passes, the backend boots and serves
real requests on the bumped deps, and `next build` compiles/type-
checks cleanly on the bumped frontend deps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CSWFWQsjTc9GyffPiXEDQT
joshuaandClaude Opus 5.5